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Coming down to earth after J.D. Vance's words, European leaders panicked. The neocon strategy of American foreign policy has destroyed Europe's strategic role, not just its economy. Will the Old Continent be able to understand all the mistakes made in the recent past and create a common foreign policy independent of Washington? An important speech by the former Greek foreign minister.
Entrusting foreign policy and defense to two politicians from the Baltic states meant political suicide of the autonomous European project
The European establishment’s panic after the trolling they suffered by JD Vance’s speech in Munich is inexplicable and unjustified. They knew what to expect. President Trump, already at his first term was speaking of Brussels as being ” a hellhole”. In the first days of this second term he made more than clear than his “America first” project does not concern only economic warfare with Europe through tariffs but also territorial claims on Greenland, and commands on NATO partners to spend 5% of GDP on defense or suffer the consequences. Secretary of State Marco Rubio was equally blunt at his opening remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. International law is not just irrelevant, it is a burden. In his own words: “The post-war global order is not just obsolete; it is now a weapon being used against us.”
Since the end of Trump’s first term, Europeans have had at least four years to prepare. Four years to build upon the longstanding French concept of European “strategic autonomy.” Instead, what did they do? They entrusted the foreign policy and defense portfolios to two politicians from the Baltic states: respectively, the hawkish former Estonian Prime Minister, Kaja Kallas, and the Lithuanian, Andrius Kubilius. This signified the political suicide of the autonomous European project. For understandable historical reasons, and given their animosity towards Russia, the Baltic states are at the forefront of those who believe the European Union cannot survive severing ties with the “big American brother.”
Neither should the Eurocrats be surprised by the references of President’s Trump or Secretary of State Pete Hegseth on the War in Ukraine. Many other from non Trumpian ecosystems have spoken in the same way before them. Just indicatively, a few examples: In an article in New York Times, not exactly Trump’s favorite media, Thomas Friedman has referred to several historical mistakes committed by the West vis-à-vis Russia that resulted to the war. For instance, according to Clinton’s defense secretary, William Perry, who spoke in 2016 at a conference of The Guardian newspaper: “Our first action that really set us off in a bad direction was when NATO started to expand, bringing in Eastern European nations, some of them bordering Russia. At that time, we were working closely with Russia and they were beginning to get used to the idea that NATO could be a friend rather than an enemy … but they were very uncomfortable about having NATO right up on their border and they made a strong appeal for us not to go ahead with that.”
George Kennan, the theoretician of the Soviet containment during the Cold War, writing some years before Perry, had called the expansion of NATO into Central Europe “the most fateful error of American policy”. «I think it is the beginning of a new cold war. I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else. This expansion would make the founding fathers of this country turn over in their graves. (…) Of course there is going to be a bad reaction from Russia, and then [the NATO expanders] will say that we always told you that is how the Russians are — but this is just wrong.”
Elites in the US and Europe have been caught off guard by events only because they adhere to an erroneous view of international politics
Prof. John J. Mearsheimer, the leading today analyst of international relations, was even more explicit in his article ‘The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine War’: “My key point is that the United States has pushed forward policies toward Ukraine that Putin and his colleagues see as an existential threat to their country—a point they have made repeatedly for many years. Specifically, I am talking about America’s obsession with bringing Ukraine into NATO and making it a Western bulwark on Russia’s border. (…) In essence, Washington played the central role in leading Ukraine down the path to destruction. History will judge the United States and its allies with abundant harshness for their remarkably foolish policy on Ukraine.” He explained further in an Economist article that “For Russia’s leaders, what is happening in Ukraine is not about its “imperial ambitions.” It is about addressing what they see as an immediate threat to Russia’s future.” And, in a more analytical article, already in 2014, he remarked: “For Putin, the illegal overthrow o Ukraine’s democratically elected and pro-Russian president—which he rightly labeled a “coup”—was the final straw. (…) Elites in the United States and Europe have been blindsided by events only because they subscribe to a flawed view of international politics.
And it is not just about NATO. A clear plurality of the European citizens believe now that the European Union played a negative role in Ukraine, with even higher percentages in countries like Greece, Italy, Austria and Hungary (see Graph 1).
War could have been avoided if we, the Europeans, had established a new European security architecture in the first decade of this century, which included Russia
The war could have been averted if we, the Europeans, had established a new European security architecture in the first decade of this century, one that included Russia. The American neoconservative view of Russia as a second-rate power hampered the progress made in the 1990s, notably the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Charter. This charter laid out the general principles for such a system, guaranteeing arms control, the right of each state to self-defense, and the collective responsibility for indivisible European security. It stipulated that “states will not enhance their security to the detriment of the security of any other state” and that “no state or group of states can have a greater responsibility to maintain peace and security in Europe.” However, the subsequent decade saw this progress reversed. Under the Bush administration, the United States disregarded Russia’s concerns of encirclement, a fear that has historically shaped its foreign policy.
It should be clear that the political unification of the European Union has always been at odds with American interests
Europe in the multipolar world
This is all now history. The crucial question moving forward is not simply how to conclude the war in Ukraine, but how to establish a new, stable European security architecture that includes Russia. A black hole in the continental map is unacceptable. The central strategic challenge lies in defining Europe’s role within the emerging multipolar international system, which has superseded both the Cold War’s bipolarity and the brief period of American unipolar dominance.
Europe faces two fundamental choices. The first is to strengthen its strategic autonomy in relation to the United States and NATO. The second is the futile pursuit of restoring Euro-Atlantic relations to the pre-Trump era, implicitly accepting American hegemony over European defense and foreign policy. This should not even be a real dilemma, given that the current American position clearly precludes any such return to the past. Yet, this latter option—one of complete capitulation—continues to be favored by many European “leaders”, who mistakenly believe that, for example, increased purchases of American weaponry can somehow secure a form of Mafia-style protection. This is one of the most tangible proofs of the lack of real leadership in the EU.
It should be clear that the emancipation of Europe from US influence and the political unification of the European Union have always been fundamentally at odds with American strategic interests. Henry Kissinger, in his magnus opus, Diplomacy, was writing: “The domination by a single power of either of Eurasia’s two principal spheres—Europe or Asia—remains a good definition of strategic danger for America, Cold War or no Cold War. For such a grouping would have the capacity to outstrip America economically and, in the end, militarily. That danger would have to be resisted even were the dominant power apparently benevolent, for if the intentions ever changed, America would find itself with a grossly diminished capacity for effective resistance and a growing inability to shape events.” (H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994, p. 813).
As Graph 2 demonstrates, a slight majority of Europeans do not believe that the EU is a power that can deal on equal terms with global powers, such as USA, China or Russia. This situation is a consequence of the ascendancy of self-defeating Atlanticism policies over the concept of European autonomy in recent years.
Most of the other world has a different, more optimistic opinion for the future of the European Union, judging positively the European potential (Graph 3).
Moreover, as it shown in the following graphs 4-5, a majority in most countries believes that China will overcome the USA in the years to come, but the influence of Russia will rise, as well. This multipolar world order requires a shift towards a completely different European foreign policy, distinct from the current one, which effectively functions as an adjunct to American diplomacy.
The establishment of a unified European foreign policy is the only way forward for Europe
The establishment of a unified and outward-looking European foreign policy, distinct from that of the United States, and the development of an autonomous European defense capability autonomous from NATO, underpinned by the solidarity clause enshrined in Article 42 (7) of the EU Treaty, constitute the sole viable pathway for Europe to assume the role of a global player, rather than remaining simply a global payer, as former President of the Commission Juncker so aptly put it. This requires a bold political decision, not the further demolition of the European welfare state, asked recently by Secretary General of NATO. Last December, Marc Rutte called on European citizens “to make sacrifices”, such as cuts to pensions, health, and security systems, in order to boost defence spending and ensure long-term security in Europe.
This a clear recipe for disaster. Based on the specter of the Russian danger, the European neo-liberals cry that “Danger is moving towards us at full speed”, so we need guns, no butter. They forget that already very little of butter is coming at the table. The erosion of the welfare state, exacerbated by the recent economic crisis, has understandably shattered public trust in political institutions. Neoliberal policies have created obscene levels of inequality, impoverishing vast segments of the European population. These inequalities are not some unavoidable byproduct of the market; they are the direct result of political decisions designed to benefit the 1% at the expense of the 99%. Europe cannot exist without its social model.
The future of Europe is at stake. Unfortunately, the current European leaders’ choices put them rather on the menu than at the table.
