The Lukashenko Factor: Belarus After Presidential Elections

The Romanian defense minister, in a passing comment, said that the presidential elections in Belarus were undemocratic. Of course, he was not the only one to make such a comment. Four days before the vote, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling on the EU to declare the elections a “sham.” However, Romania’s stance is noteworthy, as just a few weeks earlier, Romania’s Constitutional Court had annulled the first round of the presidential election in that country, basing the decision on an arbitrary assessment by the country’s intelligence services that was quickly shown to be based on inaccurate data.

Since then, Romania has been in a de facto constitutional crisis, as the scheduled elections have not been completed, new ones have not been scheduled, and the old mandate of the current/former president has expired. Stories about what is and how democratic or undemocratic, what is fictitious and what is real in today’s European politics, are largely out of place. The fact is that in the last elections in Belarus, no matter how anyone evaluates them, Alexander Lukashenko gained legitimacy for another five-year term. Not only did the current president win convincingly, but the turnout was also record high – over 85%.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the Belarusian authorities have done a lot to make the process transparent for interested observers and to ensure that the measures on the secrecy of the vote are strictly applied (rigorous control on the ban on photographing ballots) and that the ballot traditionally includes the option to vote “against all” (which is politically important, since even opposition-minded voters who do not have their own candidate or voters dissatisfied with the way the elections were organized can declare themselves and “count,” even delegitimize the entire process if their percentage is high). However, for the story of legitimacy, this time, statistical data and details about the method of voting are less important. What is important then?

First, Lukashenko campaigned as if his victory depended on every vote. Even before the election, no one questioned his convincing victory, but he cruised the country day after day, visiting businesses, schools, hospitals, talking to the people, and initiating a series of accompanying events that supported the campaign. From a broader perspective, one can even conclude that this campaign represented the “crown” of the previous four years of work, which was also marked by “meetings with the people.” Lukashenko learned the lessons from the large protests of 2020, so he turned to securing legitimacy in this way as well.

Secondly, the people did go massively to the polls and voted for him. Even those who had previously criticized Lukashenko and expressed numerous doubts about his rule have now either changed their position or “lowered their tone” (this conclusion is also based on the personal impressions of the author of the text, who has been intensively cooperating with numerous Belarusian colleagues for many years and has been to Minsk several times in the past year). What has changed in Belarus between the two election campaigns? Why are those who demonstrated on Independence Avenue five years ago now either going to the polls or assessing the situation differently? Of course, it is partly because of the “Ukraine case”.

The fate of Belarus and Lukashenko’s rule is viewed from a completely different perspective today than before, and the comparison with Ukraine is significant here. Just like Russians, Belarusians perceive Ukrainians as their closest and most similar “relatives.” However, at the same time, Belarus could never be compared to Ukraine. Unlike Belarus, Ukraine had colossal natural resources, fertile black soil, access to the sea with important ports, a strong industrial base, one of the largest energy sectors in Europe, an excellent geographical position, and at the time of independence, over 50 million inhabitants. Ukraine had the resources to become a “continental player,” a country important for the security and economy of several regions – from Eastern Europe, through the Black Sea to the Caspian-Caucasus. Where is Ukraine today? What has happened to it? And they had a democracy according to the “European model.” For decades, Ukraine, with its democracy, “slid” towards prioritizing identity issues, which gave rise to extreme nationalism, produced social polarization and political tensions, until everything finally broke down and turned into a bloody civil war. Interestingly, in Belarus, quite a few analysts are pointing to parallels with the events of the first half of the 1940s, when Ukraine was going through a similar dramatic phase. In Belarus, immediately after gaining independence, a similar strategic direction was also inaugurated with the first president Stanislav Shushkevich: prioritizing identity issues, with an emphasis on affirming the Belarusian language, along with the fragmentation of the political scene in order to “patch up” parliamentary majorities with complex coalition agreements. Lukashenko prevented this, and that was one of the reasons why he entered into conflict with the US and the EU, and the direction of Belarus’s strategic movement was determined differently.

However, this support is partly due to the obvious successes that have been achieved, both in the organization of the state system and in the economy. Looking at the parameters of the number of doctors per capita, or the number of teachers, the quality of higher education, the availability of (free) health services – Belarus is at the very top. Standards in food production, for example, exceed European ones, so not everything can be sold in stores. Moreover, with subsidized and export-oriented agriculture, food on the domestic market is twice as cheap as in the neighborhood. After the construction of the nuclear power plant, the already cheap electricity became even cheaper. For a normal life in Belarus, everything related to the so-called expanded consumer basket is several times cheaper than in the Balkan countries. In fact, the entire economy is export-oriented, with a whole range of enterprises that are competitive on the world market. And the range of products that are exported is constantly expanding. Interestingly, a few days after the elections, the “Belkommunmash” factory celebrated the production of its five hundredth tram. Never before have Belarusian factories produced trams, but today they do so, with domestic knowledge and domestic capital.

Not long ago, Boris Johnson published a brilliant book entitled “The Churchill Factor.” Undoubtedly, Johnson was much more “at ease” with writing than with practical politics. Perhaps in some of his actions, especially around the Ukraine crisis, one can recognize the “geopolitical logic of Churchill,” but the fact is that the legendary British Prime Minister is simply impossible to copy. Churchill created history, which was shaped by his surprisingly brave or unconventional decisions based on the conviction of victory, at times when few people shared such views. Churchill had goals that he did not calculate around and subordinated everything to those goals.

The differences between Churchill and Lukashenko need not be enumerated; they are numerous and easily noticeable. Without a doubt, there are too many commentators who would deny the possibility of comparing these two statesmen. However, in the context of taking bold and unconventional decisions and being confident in the correctness of the moves, even in moments when this position was shared by few people around him, there are also some similarities. The “Lukashenko factor” stubbornly refused to establish an anti-Russian discourse through state institutions, to determine a new identity course, and thus pay for a “European perspective.” But he also entered into fierce conflicts with the Russian business world, refusing to cede the Belarusian market to them at the expense of domestic companies.

He did not trust the Westerners who promised him a lot, and he did not even try to fully understand some of their policies (before the last elections, in response to a European politician who called him an autocrat, he replied: “better an autocrat than a gay”), he demanded that the Russians respect him as an equal partner, often problematizing bilateral relations due to seemingly banal disagreements, and he viewed most Ukrainian politicians (although he never told them this publicly) as complete fools who would destroy such a rich country at someone else’s expense. True, in the implementation of his policy, during all these decades, there were ups and downs, successes and crises, things that can be praised and criticized. But now, the time has come when, in the existing circumstances, the correctness of the strategic move was confirmed. I guess that is why almost no one in Minsk is interested in the EU’s positions on anything anymore. Not even about the presidential elections. That is, when criticism on that topic comes from Romania, it also serves as a topic for them to make jokes about.