War Is Over, Peace Still Not in Sight

Five hundred days have passed since the October 7 massacre, but the situation in the Middle East remains extremely tense. The issue of the second phase of Gaza negotiations has not yet been raised, and diplomatic contacts are shuttling between Cairo, Doha, Jerusalem, and Washington. The confirmation of the deaths of four-year-old Ariel Bibas and his two-year-old brother Kfir, who lived most of their short lives as hostages of Hamas in Gaza, caused a particularly emotional response in Israel. The death of their mother Shiri was also confirmed. The tragedy deeply shook public opinion not just because of the loss itself, but also because of the brutality with which the hostages were killed – the executioners took their lives in cold blood with their bare hands. Equal outrage was evoked by the cynical treatment of the bodies: the transfer of the coffins was reminiscent of a gruesome spectacle in which another person’s body was handed over instead of Shiri’s.

Netanyahu was holding a security meeting on Monday when Hamas announced from Beirut that it had handed over the bodies of the three dead, as well as the body of another hostage, Oded Lifshitz, in plastic bags. At this meeting, it was decided to change the leadership of the negotiating team. Mossad head David Barnea and Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar are to leave the team. The latter is scheduled to be fired for security breaches because the services under his command failed to prevent the October 7 massacre. The leadership of the delegation was passed to Ron Dermer, a minister and one of Netanyahu’s closest associates who enjoys the full confidence of the prime minister. This decision was an obvious signal of a change of route: control over the negotiations is shifting from the intelligence services to the political leadership, and from now on the process will be managed under the direct control of the Prime Minister.

Netanyahu already had the last word in the negotiations, but now he wants to run the game by his own rules, in full control of the course of events. Confirming the death of the Bibas brothers made his task easier to some extent, giving him even more freedom of decision. This tragic incident re-emphasized – if it was even necessary – what kind of adversary he had to deal with. In addition, following the release of the last six living hostages in the first phase of the agreement, Netanyahu decided to suspend the previously promised release of more than six hundred Palestinian prisoners. He demanded clear guarantees that Hamas would honor the conditions for the remaining hostages before proceeding with the agreements.

The murder of two little brothers and their mother, as well as the gruesome spectacle of the transfer of their bodies – which became symbols of war against their own will – forced the conflict beyond what had previously been attributed only to Israel: an attack on children. It is not just about numbers, despite the appalling scale of casualties in Gaza, where civilians have been used as human shields. After all, as early as the day after the war began, Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh openly declared that his movement needed the blood of women, men, and children. The basic problem lies in the principle itself. The imbalance in the numbers is also evident in the prisoner exchange: for every Israeli hostage released, there are many Palestinian prisoners, including those who have been behind bars more than once.

In media space, the deaths of children certainly have a special power of impact. Images from Gaza of dead and maimed children have intensified a wave of international outrage against Israeli bombing. But when it emerged that two Israeli toddlers had probably been strangled with bare hands and the transfer of their bodies involved many local children, condemnation came even from those normally critical of Israel, including the United Nations.

The changes in the Israeli delegation coincided with shuffling of the cards on the part of Hamas. According to the organization itself, it is ready to release all surviving hostages in the second phase of the deal, without delaying their release as it did in the first phase. In the third phase, the transfer of the bodies of the dead is planned.

Hamas seeks to get ahead of the curve. During the hostage release ceremonies, the organization was demonstratively forceful, launching a strong propaganda campaign to reaffirm that it still controls the situation in Gaza. However, this is a Pyrrhic victory: even Arab countries oppose Hamas continuing to rule Gaza. Many are pushing for the transfer of power to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) once the war is over. But which PNA is this about? The one led by Mahmoud Abbas, known as Abu Mazen, a figure highly unpopular with both the Palestinians themselves and many world leaders, including the Israeli government. He is, of course, trying to establish himself as the only legitimate interlocutor: recall, for example, the month-long operation in Jericho against Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the like, as well as the decision to stop payments to the families of those convicted of terrorism in Israel. And if with new leadership the Palestinian Authority could earn more credibility with voters, who could form it? If elections are held, there is not just a risk, but a very real threat that Hamas will once again become the leading political force, as it has in the past.

In the end, Hamas continues to enjoy Palestinian support. The October 7 massacres, the military conflict, and the exchange of hostages for thousands of freed Palestinian prisoners have only strengthened the organization’s grip on Gaza.

In negotiations with mediators, Hamas now takes a less uncompromising stance. Firstly, the organization realizes that its future is predetermined: Hamas has been depleted by military losses (although some intelligence sources say the group has managed to recruit as many militias as it has lost). Secondly, Hamas seeks to present itself as the “good cop” in the eyes of the media in order to garner public support and move the debate into the political mainstream. Hamas has threatened to delay the hostages release, putting forward new demands: mobile homes and excavation equipment. The group proposed to release all hostages simultaneously and alive, radically changing the narrative: allegedly, “we are the supporters of reconciliation, and the rest are violating the agreements.”

Netanyahu said he would like to move from “give-and-give” talks with the services’ leadership to “give-and-take” negotiations. In Riyadh and Cairo, where Gulf representatives have and will continue to meet at various times to discuss the impact of the war and the future of Hamas, a plan alternative to Trump’s proposal is being developed. The latter sought to “pull Arab countries out of the shadows” with his statements, urging them to really care about the fate of the Palestinians.

But the fact remains that Israel’s internal reaction to the deaths of the children was as sharp and painful as it was to all the tragic events of October 7 with its many victims. This is despite the realities of martial law, not to mention the political and economic problems within the country. Of course, Netanyahu can count on Trump’s support, but the situation remains far from resolved. The future of Hamas, the Palestinians, and the Gaza Strip remains shrouded in uncertainty. Netanyahu’s and Trump’s statements do not reflect reality. The example of Lebanon serves as a kind of litmus test: despite the fact that the war ended long ago, Israel has not withdrawn all its troops from there and continues to strike Hezbollah positions, which has not lost its power. Residents of northern Israel have still not returned to their homes. The outcome of the war, along with the casualty count, will not be summarized with proper clarity for a long time to come.