Zelensky and Increasingly Urgent Negotiations

In the run-up to Donald Trump’s inauguration at the White House, the positions of the various participants in the conflict in Ukraine seem to be becoming more clearly defined in relation to possible negotiation processes.

The US president-elect said on January 10 that preparations were underway for a meeting with the Russian leader. “President Putin wants us to meet, he has also said so publicly, and we must put an end to this war,” he added, clarifying that a possible expansion of the meeting to include Chinese President Xi Jinping would be decided in the future.

Regardless of what configuration the negotiations take, the impression is that the Ukrainian conflict will be settled and hopefully resolved by the two (or three) great powers. This scheme has certainly pleased Trump, who has never hidden his belief that European allies and their interests don’t matter, and pleased Putin, who has always defined the Kiev government as a puppet of the Anglo-Americans, accusing Europe of sacrificing its own sovereignty by handing it over to Washington.

If Trump really intends to resolve the crisis also with Iran and the military and economic confrontation with China in the Indo-Pacific region through negotiations, as well as to resume the talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un that were interrupted after his first term, then it will primarily be necessary more than ever to count on solid mutual understanding with Vladimir Putin.

The side effects of the conflict in Ukraine and the pressure by the USA and EU on the international community to isolate Russia have effectively transformed Moscow’s excellent relations with Tehran and Pyongyang into full-fledged political and military alliances, further strengthening the mutual understanding between Beijing and Moscow.

To reverse the effects of the Biden administration’s foreign policy, Trump will have to face much stronger resistance than in the past and much more compact and structured opponents, as evidenced at the economic level by the rapid growth of BRICS member countries.

Putin seems to recognize this and has made it clear he wants to meet with Trump without preconditions, while spokesman Dmitry Peskov gave a reassuring signal, saying that “with Trump in the Oval Office, we expect progress.”

However, Peskov himself said on January 13 that “at the moment there are no prerequisites for resuming negotiations with Kiev, as Ukraine has refused to do so.” If Putin negotiates only with Trump, it would not be surprising to see a hostile reaction from the EU.

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas openly stated that the EU is “ready to support Ukraine if the United States stops its engagement,” expressing skepticism about a possible meeting between the two presidents because “force is the only thing Russia understands.”

However, due to the chronic shortage of arms and ammunition that can be supplied to Kiev, Europe is unable to independently ensure the continuation of the Ukrainian military action, already undermined by the lack of arms, ammunition, and troops, especially well-trained troops.

Added to this is the rise in desertion and the decline in recruitment, which is mostly forced, while most Ukrainians avoid recruitment by hiding or trying to flee abroad.

The attempt to recruit Ukrainians living abroad also failed after the “Ukrainian Legion” that Poland offered to train attracted only 700 of the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians living or displaced in European countries.

Brussels and many European chancelleries fear that a Russian-US agreement could grant Moscow territorial annexations and neutrality to Kiev, leaving Europe, already economically devastated, where many governments are in crisis or decline, with a heavy legacy of supporting and rebuilding Ukraine, as well as a costly and protracted new cold war with Russia.

There is no shortage of concerns within NATO either. Secretary General Mark Rutte brushed off rhetoric about a possible Ukrainian victory, saying that “we must do everything we can to ensure that Ukraine has everything it needs to continue fighting and to win.”

The topic was raised again on January 11 by outgoing President Joe Biden, according to whom “Putin is in a difficult situation right now, and I think it’s very important that he not have room to maneuver. If Ukraine continues to receive support from the West, there is a real chance that it will win.”

A narrative based on three principles. The first aim is to emphasize Russia’s economic and military difficulties caused by the intensification of Western sanctions and the very high casualties Moscow is suffering in the fighting. According to Ukrainian and NATO sources, more than 1,500 people are killed and injured per day: 430,790 in 2024 alone, the Kiev General Staff said.

Estimates that seem hardly credible, judging by the testimony of Ukrainian officials to the Anglo-Saxon media, who emphasize how Russia’s superior firepower in terms of aerial bombardment (Kiev now has very few planes) and artillery allows it to devastate Ukrainian positions before advancing troops.

Moreover, it has never been the case that those with a clear superiority in firepower (estimated by some observers at 5:1 to 7:1, and by others even up to 12:1 in some parts of the front) have also suffered the greatest losses.

It is always difficult to calculate the casualties suffered by the two belligerents, both because no neutral source can confirm them and because these figures are sensitive to the stability of the home front and therefore subject to appropriate propaganda. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, more than one million Ukrainian soldiers have been killed and wounded since the beginning of the war (more than 595,000 in 2024).

The second point tends to attribute Western military aid to its ability to lead Ukraine to victory once the draft age for Ukrainian men is lowered from 25 to 20 or possibly 18, a measure that has yet to take effect but has already been approved by the Rada (Ukrainian parliament) after repeated pressure from several NATO countries.

The third point is the denial that the Russians are winning the war on the battlefield, as evidenced by the Ukrainian offensive in the Kursk Bulge area that began on August 6 and by the limited portions of Ukrainian territory captured by Moscow, representing approximately 18% of Kiev’s territory (108,000 square kilometers, including Crimea, out of 603,000), with 0.6% progress over the past two years, as recently announced by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.

The Institute for the Study of War (an American think tank inspired by neoconservatives and supporting Kiev’s position) has admitted that the Russians have seized 4168 km² of Ukrainian territory in 2024, seven times more than the 584 km² conquered in 2023.

However, assessing Moscow’s military progress based on the size of the captured territories seems flawed, as the Donetsk region, where Russia’s efforts have been concentrated, has been fortified meter by meter by the Ukrainians since 2014. But also, because the Russians’ priority objective, both in Kursk and in Donbass, appears to be first and foremost to destroy the military potential of the Ukrainian forces by annihilating their increasingly limited resources and reserves in terms of manpower, weapons, and ammunition.

Judging by the steady progress made by Moscow forces since the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in November 2023, this strategy seems to be working. In six months, Kiev has lost more territory than it has regained.

In the Donetsk region, Russian forces have accelerated their advance since the fall of Avdeyevka a year ago: having captured Ugledar, the Russians have now completed their occupation of Toretsk, parts of Chasovy Yar, and most recently occupied Kurakovo and Shevchenko, reaching the outskirts of Pokrovsk, a stronghold from which supply routes for Ukrainian forces in the region branch off.

The bitter defeats of the Ukrainians, about which, unsurprisingly, very little is said in the West, in politics and in the media. Moscow’s troops are now just a few kilometers from the border with Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, which is not part of the four oblasts annexed by Russia’s referendums in September 2022 (Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhye, and Kherson).

In Kharkov Oblast, the Russians are advancing beyond the Oskil River and have reached the outskirts of Kupyansk, and to the north they control two areas near the Russian border from which they can threaten the city of Kharkov.

In the southern direction, the Ukrainians expect an offensive in the area of the Zaporozhye Plain in order to reach the capital of the same name. And even in the most static sector of the conflict, Kherson, where the rivals are separated by the Dnieper River, several sources report the possibility that the Russians will try to cross the large waterway to regain control of the right bank from which they retreated in December 2022.

Credible or artfully spread rumors to get Ukrainians to defend all fronts instead of focusing more forces on those most vulnerable to Russian initiative.

The Ukrainians are also retreating from Russia’s Kursk region, where, according to ISW, Kiev forces now control less than 500 km² of the more than 1,100 km² they conquered in August 2024.

Even the new limited offensive launched on January 5 stalled after a few days, and the Russians began to regain ground. In this sector, the Ukrainians continue to send brigades (which are suffering heavy losses) that would instead be more profitably used to defend the shaky Donetsk front.

For Kiev and its allies, maintaining a bridgehead on Russian territory has always mattered more politically than militarily, as US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken explained well when he said on January 6 that the Ukrainian army’s position in Russia’s Kursk region “is important because it’s certainly an element that should be considered in any negotiations that may take place over the course of the year.”

Thus, for Kiev, it is a card that can be used as a bargaining chip in possible negotiations, while Moscow has every reason to face Ukrainian brigades on its territory, from an advantageous position, which consequently cannot defend the areas of Donetsk, Kharkov, and Zaporozhye.

Unlike Kiev, Russia does not appear to be short of troops: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said last month that Russia is sending 800,000 troops to the conflict zone, 100,000 more than Putin announced in early 2024.

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev said on December 24 that 440,000 “contract” volunteers had signed up this year, and in early December a NATO source in Brussels admitted that the Russians were recruiting 30,000 volunteers per month (360,000 per year) with a renewable annual contract, further bolstered since last December by debt forgiveness up to the equivalent of 100,000 euros for those signing up for the Special Military Operation.

With such prospects, it is the gradual destruction of units and the undermining of Ukrainian combat capabilities that could be the military turning point in the conflict, not just Russia’s territorial gains. The risk, which should have involved starting peace talks before Kiev’s military collapse, makes them unnecessary, turning defeat into disaster.