Opinions #25/24

“G7? In this format, it no longer makes sense. Today, to represent weight and interests at the global level, it has to include a dozen countries.” Valéry Giscard d’Estaing said so. It was 2017, and the inventor of the annual gathering of the world’s “greats” had this to say to me about the representativeness of the club he founded in Rambouillet just a year after beginning his seven-year term at the Elysee Palace. For the former French president, a group that kept out China, India, Turkey, Indonesia, and South Africa was already an anachronism. More than five years have passed, and the G7’s alarm is reaffirmed at every meeting. The West has spread to Japan, which is less relevant – economically, demographically, and strategically – in the face of ongoing dynamics. With the BRICS group that has grown dramatically from the original five member countries. With other geopolitical “sets,” from the G8 (Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Turkey) to the SCO (India, Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) representing as many aggregates as possible interested in developing relationships that increase their relevance in dealing with the West. These are worlds that sensationally highlighted the reality of the balance of power and alliances during a conference held in Switzerland this past weekend in support of Kiev’s line, given a possible future negotiation process with Moscow. In the end, only 77 countries shared the roadmap drawn up by the Ukrainians, despite Swiss negotiators stripping it of the most difficult steps for their Russian counterparts along the way. Among the departed governments are some that Zelensky was very much courting: India and Saudi Arabia are leading the way.

From the G7 “lame duck” meeting (Biden, Macron, Sunak, Scholz) that took place in Italy and the long-awaited conference in the Swiss Alps, a sobering mosaic has emerged, which confirms that as early as May 2022, a few weeks after the Russian-Ukrainian war began, an influential American analyst like Angela Stent took up her pen in Foreign Policy magazine. The essay titled “The West vs. the Rest” took a snapshot of the current state of international alliances. The Euro-Atlantic West, which had been convinced by sanction after sanction that it had isolated Russia, suddenly found itself outnumbered by the rest of the world. A reality that was confirmed and reinforced in the following two years of conflict as the Cold War divided the world once again. A fact, on which the G7 leaders should begin to reflect deeply before they lose further appeal to the worlds – Asia, Africa, and Latin America – to which they mistakenly believe they have an inescapable attraction. A bath of realism and humility, which sooner or later should infect Zelensky as well. His ambitions to return all Moscow-controlled territories to Kiev seemed unreal a year ago, and now they seem completely unrealistic. Some of his main allies are making him realize this, but the Ukrainian president still prefers to cling to the staunch supporters of Stoltenberg and the Baltic states, backed by Poland and England. The castling, which cost Zelensky the support of much of his original inner circle, was liquidated without much ado when the experts’ opinions did not coincide with the Chief’s vision. In the West, this round of defenestration was received aseptically, emphasizing rather the changes arranged in Moscow by Putin after his re-election. Fulvio Scaglione’s analysis allows us to better understand the contours of history. And Pascal Boniface suggests assessing the risks or opportunities that a possible re-election of Donald Trump might entail on the international stage.